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Should access to higher education remain ‘free’? Theoretical answers to this question are at least twofold. 
First, public higher education is said to be regressive as a privileged minority profits from extra human 
capital, and all the private benefits it generates, while the general public foots the bill. A frequent reply is 
that higher education students enjoying ‘free’ access are implicitly borrowing public money that they pay 
back when entering the labour market, via progressive income taxes. Using a simple lifecycle framework 
this paper produces realistic estimates of how much graduates are likely to ‘reimburse’ society via income 
tax. Using Belgian data on higher education public expenditure and income taxes paid by both graduates 
and non-graduates over their lifetime, we show that the implicit reimbursement rate ranges from 37% to 
95%. It is much higher for bachelors than master graduates, and for males.  
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Introduction 
 
In  most  European  countries,  public  financing  has  been  considered  as  the  traditional  approach  for 
supporting higher education. Even if tuition fees have been introduced in various countries, they only 
contribute for a small amount in addition to resources provided by governments.  The average subsidy rate 
for higher education
1 in European countries ranges from 76% to 99% (Debande, 2003).  In most cases the 
subsidy rate is above 90%. But this situation is currently debated. The existing economic literature (Johnes 
& Geske 1993 ; Creedy, 1995) suggests al least two strains of apparently conflicting reasoning on this 
issue.  
 
First, many economists consider that using public to finance higher education is regressive (Hansen & 
Weisbrod, 1969 ; Barr, 2001, 2002 ; Chapman 1997, 2001 ; Johnstone, 2004). Despite public financing 
and decades of political efforts to democratise access to higher education, enrolment and diplomation 
statistics reveal the persistence of a strong social bias in favour of better-off students. A socially privileged 
minority gains access to human capital, and all the private benefits it generates, while the general public 
foots the bill. Other economists (Creedy, 1995 ; Levy-Garboua, 1999 ; de la Fuente & Jimeno, 2005 ; 
Vandenberghe,  2004)  reply  that  higher  education  students  enjoying  ‘free’  higher  education  are  just 
implicitly borrowing public money that they pay back when entering the labour market, via progressive 
income taxes. Financing higher education with income tax money imposes and obvious burden on those 
who do not invest in higher education. But it is not a ‘free’ good from the point of view of the graduates 
who must pay higher taxes than otherwise during their working lives (Creedy, 1995). This is the implicit 
loan argument.  
 
The central aim of this paper is to disentangle these two apparently conflicting arguments. It is to develop 
and estimate a model of finance by implicit loan, in which the         contributions by both graduates (ie, 
                                                 
1 Defined as the share of direct public expenditure in educational institutions and total public subsidies to households 
and other private entities in total sources of funds for higher education.   3
the magnitude of implicit reimbursements) and non-graduates (ie, the importance of potentially regressive 
transfers) are identified. 
 
Section 1 exposes the simple model developed to assess the outcomes of a system where public higher 
education operates as an implicit loan mechanism. Section 2 contains the presentation of the Belgian data 
exploited to estimate this model and the method developed to estimate the level of contributions that non-
graduates and different categories of graduates are likely to make via progressive income taxation. Section 
3 contains the results and concludes. 
 
1. Financing higher education via an implicit loan mechanism: a simple model 
 
As stated in the introduction, ‘free’ higher education can be conceived as an implicit loan mechanism: 
student enjoy ‘free’ access but they are implicitly charged when entering the labour market, via higher 
income taxes. Before moving to empirical analysis and simulation (section 2) we need to develop a simple 
model reproducing – with a reasonable level of realism -- the functioning of a such a system.  
 
We shall assume that the current level of per student public spending corresponds to a human capital loan 
or investment (   ) made by society on a (fraction) of a particular cohort. It takes place at the age of    
and lasts until age 65  Non-graduates start repaying immediately, provided they make enough money to 
pay income taxes. While graduates logically start repaying later: at the age 22 for bachelor graduates and 
24 for master graduates. In other words, we envisage the situation where public resources financing a 
particular cohort's ‘free’ higher education is equivalent to a piece of public debt, issued when individuals 
are aged 18 and paid gradually during their whole working live. 
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1.2. Income tax  
 
Implicit loans are paid by income tax. We thus need to build taxation profiles   capturing future fiscal 
contributions by individuals, at different points of their adult lifetime. We also need to express these 
values – and all the others at stake -- in         value Euros. Said differently, monetary units of a certain 
age of the cohort’s lifecycle. We retained the age of 24. 
 
But not all income tax receipts from a particular cohort are used to finance higher education investment. A 
reasonable and simple assumption is to consider that there will be a fraction   of present value of total 
income taxes implicitly used to cover investment costs. In algebraic term the value of   must verify: 
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                           τ 
           
         [1] 
 
where: 
-   ranging from 18, 22 or 24 (the moment of labour market entrance) to 65 (the end of working 
live);  
-   is the expected amount of income tax paid by the representative individual (graduate and non-
graduate); 
    the discount rate; 
-   is the number of graduates in a cohort,   is the size of the whole population; 




                                                 
2 We assume here that wage progression is uniform across the education distribution. This assumption might be 
irrelevant in the presence of strong skill-biased technological progress resulting in a rising higher-education/college 
premium (Taber, 2001). The latter is well documented in the context of the US or the UK. The evidence is less clear 
for continental Europe, and Belgium in particular (OECD, 2000).    5
The second term of the right-hand term in equation 1 reflects the contribution of non-graduates (those who 
do not attend higher education). Equation 1 can be restated, after dividing both sides by  , to become: 
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         [2] 
 
with   ≡         the relative importance of non-graduates vis-à-vis graduates. 
 
From equation 2 we derive the central expression of our analysis: 
 
   g ≡               τ 
           
                  
      [3] 
 
where    g captures the rate of implicit reimbursment of educational investment by graduates. The higher 
this rate, the lower the level of regressive transfers between non-graduates and graduates. 
 
Note  that  if  we  assume  that     is  the  result  of  progressive  taxation  of  annual  gross  wage  ie, 
               
  with    , we clearly have that -- for any value of   --    is also progressive
3. 
 
Finally, it is also implicit from equations 1,2 & 3 that the data we will be using are                 and not 
longitudinal. Transforming these data in lifetime wage functions or profiles need to be done with some 
care. As suggested by Jacobs (2002), the main reason why cross-sections differ from time-series is that 
there  is  wage  growth  due  to  total  factor  productivity  gains  (technological progress).  This  justify  the 
presence of τ capturing the general tendency of wages -- and thus taxes -- to grow in real terms. 
 
                                                 
3Considering that progressivity requires rising average tax rate (   ), we have indeed: 
                          
                                 
                    if             is also rising with    if     
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1.3. Refinements 
 
Higher education is vast and relatively heterogeneous. The typical investment on a student attending a 
bachelor program (   =3 years) is obviously less important than the one made on someone attending a 
master (   =5 years). In addition,  annual per student costs (    ) can vary across programs  It makes 
thus perfect sense to consider that implicit borrowing varies significantly among graduates. This justifies 
assuming implicit loans of different size across categories   or graduates.  
 
                    [4] 
 
Similarly, tax contribution is likely to vary a lot among graduates. Hence, it might interesting to estimate 
the rate of implicit reimbursement of higher education costs by category  . 
 
        =                τ 
           
                   
   [5] 
 
2. Empirical evaluation 
 
In the simple model above, the key variables are the taxation profiles ( ) of non-graduates and graduates 
and  the  implicit  reimbursement  of  educational  investment  by  graduates  (   ).  The  former  will  be 
estimated here after, while the results for the latter are presented in section 3. We could immediately have 
move to the simulation exercise, using somehow arbitrary values for each of these parameters. But the 
result would be trivial and bring little substance to the paper. So we opted for the more appealing approach 
that consists of estimating the value of the profiles or parameters using real information on tax payments 
of both graduates and non-graduates. 
   7
2.1. Data 
 
Our data come from a 2002 Belgian survey: the Panel Study on Belgian Households (PSBH). For a 
sample of 4,068 individuals it provides data on annual net and gross wages, participation to labour market, 
working hours and personal characteristics (age, gender, region of residence and – most importantly – 
education).These  data  are  useful  to  evaluate  the  relationship  between  the  type  of  higher  education 
(bachelor or master
4 degrees) and wage or taxation at different stages of individuals' career, relative to less 
educated people.  
 
                                                   
 
2.2. Taxation profiles 
 
We do not use these individual data directly to compute taxation. The amount of missing values about net 
and (even more importantly) gross wages would represent a significant loss of information. Our strategy is 
inferential as it aims at using individual data to estimate plausible taxation by age         .  
 
We first use individual net wage data (   ), to estimate the OLS coefficients of a 2
nd order polynomial 
function of experience (equation 6), separately for non-graduates and graduates, but also sub-categories of 
graduates (bachelor, master, male, female...). 
 
   =                       
    ε   [6] 
 
where potential work experience (   ) is defined as the number of years since (theoretical) graduation age 
(ie; 17 for secondary school drop-outs, 19 for secondary education; 21 for bachelors, 23 for masters). Note 
that the dependent variable covers part-time workers as well as people without salaries. Strictly speaking 
                                                 
4 Typically organised within universities   8
thus, it combines the wage and employment benefits of education. In the Belgian context, the second 
effect is particularly important. As shown by Karasiotou (2004) up to 50% of the total labour market 
benefit of education is generated by higher employment rates. 
 
Second, using equation 6 OLS coefficients (       ), we compute expected net wage by age
5 profiles (      ) 
for graduates (   ) and non-graduates (    ), as well as for different categories   of graduates (bachelor 
vs master degree, female vs males, people living in Flanders vs Wallonia or Brussels). 
 
A third step implies computing expected tax by age profiles (      ). This is done in two stages. We first 
estimate the OLS coefficients of the individual gross wage (   ) regressed on a 2
nd order polynomial of net 
wage (  ).
  
 
    =                  
        [7] 
 
We then compute the expected gross wage (       ) by applying equation 7 OLS coefficients (       ) to the 
values generated by the net wage by age profile (      ). Our taxation profiles are obtained simply by taking 
the difference between expected net and gross wages (        ≡                 ). Examples of these profiles are 
displayed in graphs 1 & 2. 
 
                                                   
 
Results suggest sizeable differences in lifetime contributions. They also clearly show that higher education 
graduates  are  likely  to  pay  more  taxes  on  wages.  These  estimates  also  confirm  the  persistence  of 
significant gender gaps. 
 
Note also that our profiles can be used to estimate present values of lifetime gross wages and taxes and 
                                                 
5 The shift from wage/experience to wage/age function is immediate. We simply use the relation between age and 
potential labour experience (ie,   ≡ theoretical graduation age +    )   9
thus of the level of progressivity inherent to the current level taxation in Belgium. Results are displayed in 
graph 3. 
                         
 
3. Results and concluding comments 
 
The last set of estimates to report are the most interesting ones. Computations of implicit reimbursement 
rates (             in equations 3 & 5) presented here are based on the following technical assumptions. 
Following Jabocs (2002), general level of wage and tax receipts grow at an annual rate of 2 percent 
(τ=0.02). Remember that the justification for this could be that technical progress generates productivity 
gains that somehow benefit all individuals, and eventually produces extra tax receipts
6. We also assume a 
discout rate ( ) of 4 percent, equal to the historical return on public (risk free) European bonds. Investment 
is made at age 18, and payment starts at age 18, 22 or 24. All values are expressed in Euros at the age of 
24. The amount of money invested (     at the age of 18 is 6,000*3 Euros for bachelor students (ie, 
21,900 Euros at the age of 24) and 8,000*5 Euros (ie, 48,666 Euros at the age of 24) for master degrees. 
Finally, the proportion of a cohort that is likely to graduate is set to 35 percent (  =(1-0.35)/0.35 in 
equation 2   These figure reflect the situation of the Belgian higher education system at the beginning of 
the XXI century. 
 
Assuming the progressive wage tax system as it currently operates in Belgium remains unchanged, we 
estimate that the average rate of implicit reimbursement (   ) for a typical graduate is 52 %. In others 
words, for every Euro spent on higher education, about 48 cents is paid by the rest of the cohort that does 
not attend higher education. 
 
Table 2 contains the detailed value for the various type   of graduates (   g,k). It shows essentially that 
                                                 
6 In the case of Belgium, but also Netherlands (Jacobs, 2002), this might be a lower bound. Long-term statistics of 
hourly wage growth suggest actual rates can reach 3%.   10
bachelor graduates are likely to reimburse a greater proportion of what society has invested in them than 
students who attend university and get master degrees. For bachelor males, the rate can reach 95%, while 
it is only of 48% for males who graduate from masters. The other major result is that female graduates are 
likely  to  reimburse  much  less their  male  counterpart.  A  female  with  a  bachelor  degree  will repay  a 
maximum of 49% of the initial investment. And one with a master degree is expected to pay back 35% of 
what she received via ‘free’ access to university. 
 
                          
 
These results should be considered with caution. The gender differences for example that appear in table 2 
could be partially offset if we could account for the fact that girls tend to be over represented in less 
expensive study programs (social sciences, liberal arts, psychology...). The reader should also keep in 
mind that the results presented here are not based on longitudinal data, but cross-sectional observations 
from which lifecycle wage and taxation profiles are inferred. Further work is thus needed to check the 
robustness of these results.  
 
This said, they give some credit to those who claim that ‘free’ higher education is just a form of implicit 
loan that graduates tend to reimburse at a further stage of their life. In the Belgian context, it seems that 
males students attending bachelor/non-university programs are bound to reimburse up to 95% of what 
they received from society. But this percentage is significantly lower for university students taking master 
degrees, and females in general. For these categories, the idea that public financing might be regressive 
has still a strong appeal. 
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Tables and Graphs 
 
Table  1  –  Sample  statistics.  Sample  size            and  breakdown  by  education  level,  gender  and 
geographical area 
 
    Highest degree obtained   
Gender  Region  Less than 










357  396  226  183  1162 
Flanders 
(0.31)  (0.34)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (1.00) 
234  243  121  175  773 
Male 
Wallonia & 
Brussels  (0.30)  (0.31)  (0.16)  (0.23)  (1.00) 
317  459  329  118  1223 
Flanders 
(0.26)  (0.38)  (0.27)  (0.10)  (1.00) 
273  272  181  184  910 
Female 
Wallonia & 
Brussels  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (1.00) 
Total    1181  1370  857  660  4068 
* non-university **mainly university 
 
   13
Graph 1 – Annual income tax profiles. Breakdown by degree. Males living in Wallonia  & Brussels 
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Graph 2  – Annual income tax profiles. Breakdown by degree. Female living in Wallonia  & Brussels 
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Graph  3– Av                   (taxes as % of gross wage) according to level of lifetime gross wage (ie, 
tax progressivity) 
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Table 2 –  Rate of implicit reimbursement (    ) of higher education public investment. Breakdown by 
higher education degree, gender and region 
 





Flanders  0.47  0.35 
Female  Wallonia & 
Brussels  0.49  0.34 
Flanders  0.95  0.48 
Male  Wallonia & 
Brussels  0.83  0.47 
* 3 year programs (non-university). Investment worth 21,900 Euros at the age of 24. 
** 5 year programs (mainly university). Investment worth 48,666 Euros at the age of 24. Département des Sciences Économiques
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